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ABSTRACT
Does government debt affect interest rates? Despite a substantial body of empirical analysis,
the answer based on the past two decades of research is mixed. While many studies suggest, at most,
a single-digit rise in the interest rate when government debt increases by one percent of GDP, others
estimate either much larger effects or find no effect. Comparing results across studies is complicated
by differences in economic models, definitions of “government debt” and “interest rates,”
econometric approaches, and sources of data. 
Using a standard set of data and a simple analytical framework, we reconsider and add to
empirical evidence on the effect of federal government debt and interest rates. We begin by deriving
analytically the effect of government debt on the real interest rate and find that an increase in
government debt equivalent to one percent of GDP would be predicted to increase the real interest
rate by about two to three basis points. While some existing studies estimate effects in this range,
others find larger effects. In almost all cases, these larger estimates come from specifications relating
federal deficits (as opposed to debt) and the level of interest rates or from specifications not
controlling adequately for macroeconomic influences on interest rates that might be correlated with
deficits. 
We present our own empirical analysis in two parts. First, we examine a variety of
conventional reduced-form specifications linking interest rates and government debt and other
variables. In particular, we provide estimates for three types of specifications to permit comparisons
among different approaches taken in previous research; we estimate the effect of: an expected, or
projected, measure of federal government debt on a forward-looking measure of the real interest
rate; an expected, or projected, measure of federal government debt on a current measure of the real
interest rate; and a current measure of federal government debt on a current measure of the real
interest rate. Most of the statistically significant estimated effects are consistent with the prediction
of the simple analytical calculation. Second, we provide evidence using vector autoregression
analysis. In general, these results are similar to those found in our reduced-form econometric
analysis and consistent with the analytical calculations. 
Taken together, the bulk of our empirical results suggest that an increase in federal
government debt equivalent to one percent of GDP, all else equal, would be expected to increase the
long-term real rate of interest by about three basis points, though one specification suggests a larger
impact, while some estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. By presenting
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I. Introduction 
The recent resurgence of federal government budget deficits has rekindled debates 
about the effects of government debt on interest rates.  While the effects of government 
debt on the economy can operate through a number of different channels, many of the 
recent concerns about federal borrowing have focused on the potential interest rate effect.  
Higher interest rates caused by expanding government debt can reduce investment, 
inhibit interest-sensitive durable consumption expenditures, and decrease the value of 
assets held by households, thus indirectly dampening consumption expenditures through 
a wealth effect.  The magnitude of these potential adverse consequences depends on the 
degree to which federal debt actually raises interest rates.   
While analysis of the effects of government debt on interest rates has been 
ongoing for more than two decades, there still is little empirical consensus about the 
magnitude of the effect, and the difference in views held on this issue can be quite stark.  
While some economists believe there is a significant, large, positive effect of government 
debt on interest rates, others interpret the evidence as suggesting that there is no effect on 
interest rates.  Unfortunately, both economic theory and empirical analysis of the 
relationship between debt and interest rates have proved inconclusive. 
  We review the state of the debate over the effects of government debt on interest 
rates and provide some additional perspectives not covered in other reviews.  We also 
present some new empirical evidence on this relationship.  The paper is organized as 
follows.  In the second section, we discuss the potential theoretical effects of government 
debt on interest rates, and provide what we think are some important guidelines for 
interpreting empirical analysis of this issue.  In the third section, we look at some basic 
  2empirical facts about federal government debt and interest rates, review recent 
econometric analysis of the interaction of federal government debt and interest rates, and 
introduce some new analysis of this relationship.  Finally, in the last section, we 
summarize our conclusions and briefly discuss the potential effects of government debt 
on the economy in general. 
 
II.  Theory:  How Might Government Debt Affect Interest Rates? 
A standard benchmark for understanding and calibrating the potential effect of 
changes in government debt on interest rates is a standard model based on an aggregate 
production function for the economy in which government debt replaces, or “crowds 
out,” productive physical capital.
1  In brief, this model has the interest rate (r) determined 
by the marginal product of capital (MPK), which would increase if capital (K) were 






in which L denotes labor units, A is the coefficient for multifactor productivity, and " is 
the coefficient on capital in the production function, then the total return to capital in the 
economy (MPK*K) as a share of output (Y) equals ": 
" = (MPK×K)/Y.  
This implies that the interest rate is determined by: 
r = MPK = "×(Y/K) = "×




1 See Ball and Mankiw (1995), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Council of Economic Advisers (2003). 
  3If government debt completely crowds out capital, so that 
∂K/∂D = -1, 
then an exogenous increase in government debt (holding other factors constant) causes 
the interest rate to increase: 
∂r/∂D = (∂r/∂K)(∂K/∂D) = " × (1-") × (Y/K
2) > 0 
(because 0<"<1 and Y, K >0).   
In this theoretical framework, which is commonly used to describe the potential 
effects of government debt on interest rates, there are several important implications for 
empirical analysis of those effects.  First, the level of the interest rate is determined by the 
level of the capital stock and, thus, by the level of government debt.  It is the change in 
the interest rate that is affected by the government budget deficit, which is essentially 
equal to the change in government debt.  Empirical estimates of the effect on interest 
rates tend to differ markedly depending on whether the deficit or debt is used (as we 
show later), and most empirical work uses a specification different from that implied by a 
this economic model; that is, the deficit is regressed on the level of the interest rate.  
A model that suggests that deficits affect the level of the interest rate is a 
Keynesian IS-LM framework where deficits increase the interest rate not only because 
debt may crowd out capital but also because deficits stimulate aggregate demand and 
raise output.  However, an increase in interest rates in the short run from stimulus of 
aggregate demand is a quite different effect than an increase in long-run interest rates 
owing to government debt crowding out private capital.  Moreover, as discussed by 
Bernheim (1987), it is quite difficult (requiring numerous assumptions about various 
  4elasticities) to construct a natural Keynesian benchmark for quantifying the short-term 
stimulus from deficits and the long-term crowding out of capital in trying to parse out the 
effect of government deficits on interest rates. 
  Second, factors other than government debt can influence the determination of 
interest rates in credit markets.  For example, in a growing economy, the monetary 
authority will purchase some government debt in order to expand the money supply and 
try to keep prices relatively constant.
2  Government debt held by the central bank does 
not crowd out private capital formation, but many empirical studies of federal 
government debt and interest rates ignore central bank purchases of government debt.   
More difficult econometric problems are posed by the fact that other potentially 
important, but endogenous, factors are involved in the supply and demand of loanable 
funds in credit markets.  In addition to public sector debt, private sector debt incurred to 
increase consumption also could potentially crowd out capital formation.  Typically, 
measures of private sector debt or borrowing are not included in empirical studies of 
government debt.  In a variant of a neoclassical model of the economy that implies 
Ricardian equivalence, increases in government debt (holding government consumption 
outlays and marginal tax rates constant) are offset by increases in private saving and thus 
the capital stock is not altered by government debt and the interest rate does not rise.
3  
Private sector saving is usually not included in empirical analyses of government debt 
and the interest rate.  Also, in an economy that is part of a global capital market, increases 
in government debt can be offset by increases in foreign sector lending.  Many empirical 
                                                 
2 See McCallum (1984) for more discussion of this issue. 
3 See Bernheim (1987), Barro (1989), and Seater (1993) for discussions of the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis.   
  5analyses of government debt and interest rates do not account for foreign sector lending 
and purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. 
  Finally, the interest rate is also affected by other general macroeconomic factors 
besides capital that influence output (Y); in the simple model here, that includes labor and 
multifactor productivity.  Thus there is usually some accounting for general 
macroeconomic factors that can affect the performance of the economy in empirical 
analyses of the effect of government debt on interest rates.  
Certain assumptions—Ricardian equivalence or perfectly open international 
capital markets in which foreign saving flows in to finance domestic government 
borrowing—provide one benchmark for the potential effect of government debt on the 
interest rate.  In these scenarios, government debt does not crowd out capital (i.e., ∂K/∂D 
= 0) and, thus, has no effect on the interest rate.  For the alternative crowding-out 
hypothesis (i.e., -1≤∂K/∂D<0), the production-function framework presented above can 
provide a range of plausible calculations of the potential increase in interest rates from an 
increase in the government debt. 
By taking logs of the interest rate equation above, differentiating, and noting that 
dlnx is approximately equal to the percentage change (%∆) in x yields: 
%∆r  = %∆Y - %∆K =  ("-1)(%∆K) + (1- " )%∆L. 
Because labor input is typically held constant (i.e., %∆L=0) in the debt-crowd-out 
experiment, 
 % ∆r = (" -1)(%∆K) . 
  6For the purpose of calculating a benchmark, we assume that the capital share of 
output is " = 1/3, which is approximately equal to its historical value in the United States.  
National accounts data suggests that the marginal product of capital is about 10 percent.  
The value of U.S. private fixed assets (less consumer durables) is about $31 trillion.
4  
Thus an increase in government debt of one percent of GDP—equal to about $110 
billion—would reduce the capital stock by 0.36 percent, assuming that there is no offset 
to the increase in federal debt from increased domestic saving or inflows of foreign 
saving (i.e., ∂K/∂D = -1).  Multiplying this percentage decline by –0.67 (which is equal to 
" -1, where " = 0.33) implies an increase in the marginal product of capital of 0.24 
percent.  The resulting increase in interest rates is 2.4 basis points, as shown in the first 
column of Table 1.  Similarly, a government surplus of one percent of GDP would be 
expected to decrease interest rates 2.4 basis points.   
If the increase in federal debt were larger—five percent of GDP—then interest 
rates are calculated to rise by 11.8 basis points, as the second row of the first column in 
Table 1 shows.  This effect could be the result of an increase in federal debt in a single 
year, or the result of a persistent increase in federal debt (i.e, a persistent deficit) of one 
percent of GDP per year over five years.  An increase in the federal debt of ten percent of 
GDP—again, the result of a one-time increase or the consequence of a persistent increase 
                                                 
4 We calculate the private capital stock using data in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts on the 
fixed assets of the household, business, farm (excluding farm land, which is not included in the Accounts), 
and non-profit sectors of the economy.  This measure does not include stocks of consumer durables or 
business inventories.  Moreover, this measure understates the size of the total capital stock in the United 
States that could potentially be affected by federal government debt since it does not include the capital of 
state and local governments, and thus somewhat overstates the potential percentage change in interest rates 
from federal government debt crowding out capital formation in other sectors of the economy.  
  7in federal debt of 1 percent of GDP per year over ten years—would increase interest rates 
by 23.7 basis points.
5 
Currently, total federal debt held by the public is about $4 trillion, or 12.9 percent 
of the $31 trillion private capital stock.  Holding other factors constant, eliminating the 
federal debt (measured in this way) entirely, and assuming it would increase the private 
capital stock on a one-for-one basis, implies a decrease in interest rates of 86 basis points, 
as shown in the fourth row of the first column. 
The calculations in the first column of Table 1 assume no offset from increased 
private saving or capital inflows from abroad, which is not consistent with the U.S. 
economic experience.  As shown in the second column, if, for example, 20 percent of the 
increase in government debt is offset by these factors (i.e., ∂K/∂D = -0.8) then a $110 
billion (one percent of GDP) increase in federal government debt would reduce the U.S. 
capital stock by $88 billion, or about 0.28 percent.  This implies an increase in the 
marginal product of capital of 0.19 percent, so the resulting increase in interest rates is 
about 1.9 basis points.  An increase in federal debt of five percent of GDP—or a $550 
billion increase in government debt—would increase the interest rate by 9.5 basis points.  
Alternatively, totally eliminating the federal debt is calculated to reduce interest rates by 
about 69 basis points.  Assuming a larger, but plausible, offset to increases in federal debt 
                                                 
5 Expectations of future government borrowing are not part of the simple framework presented here. But it 
is probably a reasonable benchmark to assume that the expected crowding-out effect on current interest 
rates from expected future federal borrowing is similar in magnitude to the calculations presented here; i.e., 
if borrowing is expected to be higher by one percent of GDP in each of the next ten years then the current 
real interest rate may be expected to be about 24 basis points higher.  However, Cohen and Follette (2003) 
have shown that budget deficit forecasts beyond one year are typically very poor, primarily owing to the 
difficulty in forecasting federal tax receipts.  See Congressional Budget Office (2004) also for a discussion 
about the difficulty of forecasting federal budget deficits. 
  8from domestic and/or foreign saving of 40 percent (i.e., ∂K/∂D = -0.6)
6, suggests that 
even an increase in federal debt equal to ten percent of GDP would only increase interest 
rates by 14 basis points.  Under this scenario, eliminating the federal debt would lower 
interest rates a little over 50 basis points. 
These calculations provide a reasonable benchmark for evaluating the traditional 
crowding-out effect on interest rates of an exogenous increase in government debt, 
holding other factors constant.  Given the size of deficits and surpluses seen in the United 
States, these effects are more subdued than one might think given some of the 
commentary on federal deficits and interests rates.  However, because other factors that 
influence interest rates are not constant, changes in government debt are influenced by 
both exogenous and endogenous factors, and the likely interest rate effects of changes in 
federal government debt consistent with historical U.S. experience may be in the range of 
single-digit basis points, this poses a particular burden on empirical analysis to estimate 
these effects with less-than-perfect data and econometric techniques. 
 
III.  Empirical Evidence:  Is There a Clear Answer? 
Because economic theory is not conclusive in determining whether federal 
government debt raises interest rates, and if it does, by how much, then this issue must 
ultimately be addressed by empirical analysis.  However, model-based calculations of the 
potential effects of government debt on interest rates are instructive and provide some 
benchmarks to help assess empirical estimates of this relationship.  Before turning to 
econometric analysis of the possible effects of federal government debt on interest rates 
                                                 
6 This is a measure of the degree of offset to federal government borrowing that is consistent with a 
discussion in Council of Economic Advisers (1994), for example. 
  9in the United States, we first examine some basic empirical facts about government debt, 
interest rates, and other related factors in the U.S. economy.  These facts illustrate some 
of the difficulties posed for econometric analysis. 
 
A. Some  Basic  Facts 
Over the past half-century U.S. federal government debt held by the public as a 
percent of GDP has fluctuated from a high of about 60 percent of GDP to a low of around 
25 percent of GDP in the mid-1970s, as shown in Figure 1.
7  While federal debt climbed 
during the 1980s and early 1990s to almost 50 percent of GDP, it declined thereafter and 
still remains below 40 percent of GDP despite its recent upturn. 
Federal borrowing, or the yearly change in federal debt, as a percent of GDP has 
averaged about two percent over the past fifty years, and has fluctuated from peaks 
around five percent of GDP to the retirement of debt equal to about three percent of GDP 
in 2000, as shown in Figure 2.
8  Not surprisingly, federal borrowing tended to rise shortly 
after the recession episodes in 1974-75, 1980-81, 1990-91, and 2001. 
One of the primary concerns about federal debt is its potential to crowd out the 
formation of capital in the economy.  Figure 3 shows federal government debt as a 
percentage of the U.S. private capital stock.
9  Federal government debt is currently equal 
                                                 
7 Data on federal government debt held by the public are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Fund 
Accounts, and includes federal debt held by the Federal Reserve.  This measure of federal government debt 
does not, of course, include the implicit unfunded liabilities associated with the Social Security and 
Medicare programs.  Data for GDP are from the National Income and Product Accounts produced by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
8 “Federal borrowing” here is the net issuance of new federal debt, as measured by the Federal Reserve’s 
Flow of Funds Accounts, and thus is not exactly equal to the federal “unified federal budget deficit” though 
it is closely correlated with it.  However, it is a measure that captures better the potential effects of federal 
borrowing in credit markets. 
9 This measure of the U.S. private capital stock is constructed with data from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Fund Accounts, as we described in footnote 4. 
  10to about 13 percent of the private capital stock, which provides an upper bound on the 
amount of capital that federal debt could have directly crowded out. 
The federal government is not the only borrower in U.S. credit markets, and 
indeed it is not the largest.  Figure 4 shows that federal government debt as a share of 
total U.S. domestic (nonfinancial) debt has declined significantly since 1953, and it 
currently is less than 20 percent of total debt.
10  Figure 5 shows annual federal borrowing 
relative to total domestic U.S. borrowing.  Federal government borrowing currently 
claims about one-fifth of the total funds loaned in U.S. credit markets.  As global capital 
markets have become more integrated over time, the relevant size of the loanable funds 
market in which federal government debt interacts is much larger than the size of just the 
U.S. credit market, and thus these two figures overstate the relative size of federal debt 
and borrowing in the pool of available loanable funds.  We return to this point below. 
The debt incurred by the household, business, and state and local government 
sectors, consistently has been larger than that incurred by the federal government over the 
past fifty years; it has also grown at a faster rate.  Figure 6 shows U.S. domestic 
nonfederal (nonfinancial) debt as a percentage of GDP.  Currently standing at 
approximately 160 percent of GDP, domestic nonfederal debt is about four times as large 
as federal government debt.  Figure 7 presents annual nonfederal borrowing as a 
percentage of GDP; such borrowing has consistently been greater than federal borrowing 
over the past fifty years, except during the credit crunch of the early 1990s. 
Foreign saving is an ever more important source of funds to U.S. credit markets, 
one which could also potentially influence the effect of federal government debt on 
                                                 
10 We constructed data for U.S. domestic (nonfinancial) debt and borrowing used in Figures 4 through 7 
from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts. 
  11interest rates.  Indeed, foreign funds increasingly have been used to purchase U.S. federal 
government debt.  As shown in Figure 8, while foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury 
securities where less than five percent of total outstanding federal debt just over 30 years 
ago, foreign purchases of Treasury securities have increased dramatically since then, and 
foreigners currently hold a little more than one-third of total federal debt.
11  Note that the 
recent surge in foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is not unprecedented, as both 
the early 1970s and the mid-1990s were periods when foreigners significantly increased 
their holdings of Treasury instruments.   
Domestic private savers and foreign savers are not the only sectors that hold debt 
issued to the public by the federal government.  As the U.S. monetary authority, the 
Federal Reserve also holds Treasury securities, using them in conducting monetary 
policy.  The Federal Reserve currently holds about 15 percent of outstanding Treasury 
securities, up from around ten percent about a decade ago, as Figure 9 shows.  In a 
growing economy, the Federal Reserve must consistently acquire some Treasury 
securities in open-market operations to expand the money supply and prevent deflation, 
as we noted in the previous section.  Treasury debt that is purchased by the Federal 
Reserve in order to increase the money supply may not have the same effect of crowding 
out private capital formation as federal debt purchased by the private sector. 
Financing decisions of the federal government along with those of private sector 
borrowers, state and local government borrowers, domestic and foreign savers, and the 
Federal Reserve all interact in the U.S. and international credit market to influence 
interest rates on U.S. Treasury debt and other debt.  To get a sense of what effect U.S. 
                                                 
11 Data on U.S. Treasury security holdings shown in Figures 9 and 10 are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow 
of Funds Accounts. 
  12federal government debt has had on interest rates, it is instructive to look at the historical 
evolution in federal debt (relative to GDP) compared to interest rates over the past fifty 
years.  Figure 10 shows U.S. federal government debt held by the public as a percentage 
of GDP and a measure of the real interest rate on ten-year Treasury securities.
12  While 
federal debt relative to GDP has varied substantially, the real interest rate has been less 
variable, and is currently equal to its average value over the past fifty years of about three 
percent.  Indeed, the simple correlation between the stock of federal debt and this 
measure of the real interest rate over the entire period shown is only 0.15.  Over the 
twenty-year period from the early 1950s to the early 1970s—when federal debt decreased 
by 50 percent relative to the size of the economy—the real interest rate remained 
relatively constant.  The real interest rate did rise in the early 1980s, coincident with an 
increase in federal debt, but the real interest rate then declined and remained quite steady 
even as federal debt continued to grow in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then fell in the 
late 1990s. 
Figure 11 shows annual federal government borrowing as a percentage of GDP 
relative to the real rate on ten-year Treasury securities.  Here the correlation between 
federal government borrowing and the real interest rate is 0.39, higher than between 
federal government debt and the real interest rate, but still modest.  As we noted earlier, a 
simple economic model of crowding-out implies that federal government borrowing, 
which is equal to the change in federal government debt, is related to the change in the 
real interest rate rather than the level of the real interest rate, as shown in Figure 11.  
Figure 12 plots federal government borrowing (as a percentage of GDP) relative to the 
                                                 
12 Data on nominal ten-year Treasury yields are from the Federal Reserve.  The real interest rate is 
computed by subtracting the average expected inflation rate for the CPI from the Livingston Survey 
compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank in Philadelphia.   
  13change in the real ten-year Treasury rate.  The correlation between federal borrowing and 
the change in the real interest rate is 0.06, much smaller than the correlation between 
federal borrowing and the level of the real interest rate. 
In addition to the concern that federal government debt might crowd out private 
capital formation by causing real interest rates to rise, federal government debt may also 
pose the temptation to monetize the debt, causing inflation.  The presentation in Figure 13 
of data for federal government debt (as a percentage of GDP) and both the expected 
inflation rate and the inflation rate shows that this concern has not been a problem in the 
United States over the past fifty years.
13  The correlation between federal government 
debt and the actual inflation rate is –0.71 over this period (and is similar for the expected 
inflation rate); inflation peaked when the federal debt relative to GDP was at its lowest 
points and declined as federal debt grew in the 1980s. 
Returning to the potential effects of government debt on real interest rates, it is 
also useful to examine the difference in real interest rates between the United States and 
other major industrial economies.  If international capital markets were not well 
integrated, then real interest rates might vary according to differences in government debt 
and borrowing patterns.  Alternatively, if credit markets were integrated in the global 
economy, then real interest rates might be expected to be more similar across these 
different economies.  Figure 14 presents real interest rates on ten-year government 
securities for the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United 
                                                 
13 The expected inflation rate is the same measure from the Livingston Survey used to construct the real 
interest rate in the previous charts.  The actual rate of inflation is measured by the growth rate in the price 
index for personal consumption expenditures in the National Income and Product Accounts. 
  14Kingdom since 1990.
14  Over this period real interest rates have generally declined, and 
there currently is much less dispersion in these real interest rates than there was in the 
early 1990s.  Italy has the lowest real interest rate—just below two percent—while 
Germany has the highest at just under four percent.  However, the current government 
financial positions of these countries are quite different.  While Japan currently has a 
stock of government debt of more than 70 percent of GDP, and an annual budget deficit 
of about seven percent of its GDP, its real interest rate is virtually the same as the United 
States and France, which both have stocks of government debt and flow deficits (both 
relative to GDP) about half the size of those in Japan.  Italy, currently with the lowest real 
interest rate, has a ratio of government debt to GDP of more than 90 percent, the highest 
in this group of economies.  The United Kingdom currently has a deficit to GDP ratio of 
1.5 percent, and Canada has a government surplus of almost one percent, but real interest 
rates in those countries are somewhat higher than in the United States.  The similarity of 
real interest rates across these countries despite having very different government 
borrowing needs suggests that global credit markets are fairly integrated, so that the pool 
of loanable funds that any government may draw from substantially exceeds funds in the 
domestic credit market alone. 
  There are several basic points that summarize our assessment of these data on 
U.S. federal government debt and interest rates.  First, the federal government is not the 
largest borrower in the U.S. domestic credit market, and the stock of outstanding federal 
debt has generally remained under 25 percent of total U.S. domestic debt for the past 30 
                                                 
14 These measures of the real interest rate are constructed using data from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) for nominal ten-year government bond yields and the actual rate of 
growth in the price index for personal consumption expenditures in each country’s national income 
accounts.  To our knowledge, measures of expected inflation for each country are not readily available. 
  15years.  Second, there is strong evidence that global credit markets have become 
increasingly integrated, so the relative role of U.S. federal government borrowing in the 
relevant international market for loanable funds is even smaller than in the domestic 
credit market.  Third, the simple bivariate correlation between federal government debt 
and real interest rates in the United States has been quite weak over the past fifty years, 
so a strong positive relationship between federal government debt and real interest rates 
is not obvious.  Of course, more rigorous econometric analysis of this relationship is 
necessary before a more definitive conclusion can be drawn. 
 
B.  Review of Previous Studies 
Several different surveys over the past twenty years have evaluated the empirical 
literature on the relationship between federal government debt and interest rates:  Barth, 
Iden, and Russek (1984), Bernheim (1987, 1989), Barro (1989), Barth, Iden, Russek, and 
Wohar (1991), Seater (1993), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Gale and Orszag 
(2002, 2003), for example.  Despite the volume of work, no universal consensus has 
emerged.  For example, Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar (1991), referring also to their 
earlier review, write: “There was not then and there is not now a clear consensus on 
whether there is a statistically and economically significant relationship between 
government deficits and interest rates…  Since the available evidence on the effects of 
deficits is mixed, one cannot say with complete confidence that budget deficits raise 
interest rates and reduce saving and capital formation.  But, equally important, one cannot 
say that they do not have these effects.”   
  16In their surveys of studies of Ricardian equivalence, Bernheim (1987, 1989) and 
Seater (1993) enumerate problems with tests of this hypothesis performed by examining 
the relationship between federal government debt and deficits with interest rates.  
Bernheim (1989) concludes that: “…it is easy to cite a large number of studies that 
support any conceivable position.”  However, in the end, Seater generally finds more 
overall support for the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, which implies that federal 
government debt has no effect on interest rates, than does Bernheim, who argues that the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis should be rejected, which would make a positive 
relationship between federal government debt and interest rates more likely.  Barro 
(1989) takes a similar position as Seater, concluding:  “Overall, the empirical results on 
interest rates support the Ricardian view.  Given these findings, it is remarkable that most 
macroeconomists remain confident that budget deficits raise interest rates.”   
In discussing empirical research on federal government debt and interest rates, 
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) state that:  “…it is worth noting that this literature has 
typically supported the Ricardian view that budget deficits have no effect on interest 
rates.”  However, they go on to evaluate this evidence, writing: “Our view is that this 
literature, like the literature regarding the effect of fiscal policy on consumption, is 
ultimately not very informative.  Examined carefully, the results are simply too hard to 
swallow…”.  Gale and Orszag (2002) in their survey of the economic effects of federal 
government debt also acknowledge that: “…the evidence from the literature as a whole is 
mixed”, but go on to conclude:  “Closer examination of the literature, however, suggests 
the findings may not be as ambiguous as they initially appear.  Indeed, studies that 
(properly) incorporate deficit expectations in addition to current deficits tend to find 
  17economically and statistically significant connections between anticipated deficits and 
current long-term interest rates.”  
Thus, while surveys of the empirical literature on federal government debt and 
interest rates note the wide range of results reported in different studies, interpretations 
and assessments of these mixed empirical results still differ.  While we do not evaluate 
every empirical paper that has been written on the relationship between federal 
government debt and interest rates, we will offer an assessment of the existing literature, 
focusing primarily on more recent papers.  
Many studies analyzing the effects of U.S. federal government debt or deficits on 
U.S. interest rates do not incorporate the potential effects of the fact that international 
financial markets are increasingly integrated.  To account for this, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1990) and Barro (1991) provide estimates of the effects economic, fiscal, and 
monetary policy variables on expected real world interest rates across ten major 
developed economies, including the United States.  They use a structural approach where 
the world interest rate is determined by investment demand and desired saving.  While, 
they conclude that current government debt or deficits do not play an important role in 
the determination of real expected interest rates in these countries, their empirical 
analysis does not use expected future government deficits or debt.  
Cohen and Garnier (1991) use forecasts of federal deficits for the United States 
provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and in additional analysis 
also investigate the effects of forecasts of general government deficits made by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on interest rates 
across the G7 countries.  Their analysis yields mixed results.  For the United States, they 
  18generally do not find significant effects of the current deficit or expected deficits on 
interest rates, although they do find a significant statistical relationship between OMB 
deficit forecast revisions and interest rates in the United States.  Their estimates imply 
that an upward revision in OMB’s federal deficit forecast of one percentage point of GDP 
could increase real interest rates by about 80 to100 basis points.  However, the theoretical 
calculations that we presented earlier raise the question of whether this result is 
economically plausible.  In their analysis of the G7 countries, they find no evidence of a 
positive and significant relationship between home country current debt or deficits and 
current interest rates, similar to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) and Barro (1991), and 
find that one-year-ahead forecasts of home-country government deficits by the OECD 
tend to have a significant negative effect on nominal short-term interest rates, in contrast 
to the prediction of the government deficit crowding-out hypothesis.  However, one-year-
ahead forecasts of other-country government deficits by the OECD tend to have a 
significant effect on home-country nominal short-term interest rates in the direction 
consistent with the government deficit crowding-out hypothesis, and also imply that 
credit markets across these countries are integrated. 
Cebula and Koch (1989) explore the effect of the current U.S. federal government 
deficit, split into its cyclical and structural components, on both ten-year Treasury yields 
and corporate bond yields, while also controlling for foreign capital inflows.  Their 
results imply that positive foreign capital inflows significantly lower both Treasury and 
corporate rates, consistent with integrated global credit markets, and significantly reduce 
the estimated effect of structural government deficits on interest rates.  They find a 
statistically insignificant effect of the structural federal government deficit on Treasury 
  19yields, while reporting a statistically significant effect of the structural federal 
government deficit on corporate bond yields, implying that the structural federal 
government deficit affects the yield spread between corporate and Treasury rates.  It is 
not obvious why structural federal government deficits should affect the corporate to 
Treasury yield spread.  In contrast, Laubach (2003) reports that, based on regression 
analysis, he finds no evidence that yield spreads between corporate bonds and Treasuries, 
adjusted for cyclical variation, are systematically related to projected deficit-to-GDP 
ratios.  Thus the fact that Cebula and Koch are using current federal deficits in their 
analysis instead of expected federal deficits may be contributing to their result.
 15  
Elmendorf (1993) analyzes the effect of expected federal government deficits on 
Treasury yields using a private-sector forecast of the federal government deficit from 
Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), instead of federal government deficit projections made by 
OMB or the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  Presumably, the DRI deficit forecast 
incorporates expectations of fiscal policy changes that are not part of CBO and OMB 
projections, and thus may be a more accurate reflection of financial market participants’ 
expectations of future federal government deficits.  Regression results show that the DRI 
forecasts of federal government deficits have significant and large (and statistically 
significant) positive effects on medium-term (three- or five-year) Treasury yields—an 
increase in the expected deficit of one percent of GDP is estimated to increase medium-
term Treasury rates by more than 40 basis points—but have a smaller and statistically 
                                                 
15 In a subsequent paper by Cebula and Koch (1994), again investigating the effects of current federal 
government deficits and capital inflows on corporate yields, they do not separate the deficit into its 
structural and cyclical components, and do not report results of the effects of deficits and capital inflows on 
Treasury yields.  Given the results of their 1989 analysis, these are significant omissions, so it is not clear 
how to interpret their findings of a positive effect of government deficits on corporate yields in their 1994 
paper. 
  20insignificant effect on a long-term (20-year) Treasury rate.  If federal government 
borrowing is crowding out private capital formation then one would expect to find a 
larger impact on long-term interest rates than on shorter-term interest rates.   
Kitchen (2002) examines the effects of the CBO’s current ‘standardized’ federal 
government deficit measure—which adjusts the actual deficit for business cycle effects 
and other (usually) one-time budget effects—on the spread between the three-month 
Treasury yield and longer-term Treasury rates, rather than the level of Treasury rates.  In 
a parsimonious specification controlling only for inflation and the difference between 
actual GDP and CBO’s measure of potential GDP, he estimates that a one percent 
increase in the current standardized federal government deficit (relative to GDP) 
increases the spread between the ten-year Treasury rate and the three-month Treasury rate 
by 42 basis points.  This estimate is much larger than the benchmark calculations from 
our simple economic framework presented above.  Moreover, Kitchen uses a regression 
specification—effectively regressing the level of the interest rate on the federal deficit—
that is not implied by the model.  Also, because the estimates are based on current 
measures of interest rates and the federal deficit, it is not obvious whether the influence 
of other economic factors that might affect the interest rate, but are not included in his 
parsimonious regression specification, is affecting the estimate of the effect of federal 
deficits.   
Laubach (2003) estimates the effect of five-year-ahead projections by CBO of 
federal government debt or deficits on the five-year-ahead real ten-year Treasury yield. 
The purpose for using five-year-ahead interest rates and debt or deficit projections is to 
try to omit any effects of current economic conditions from measuring the effects of 
  21federal government deficits on the interest rate.  He finds that a one-percentage-point 
(relative to GDP) increase in the measure of the expected federal government deficit 
increases the forward-looking ten-year Treasury rate by 28 basis points.  However, when 
Laubach estimates an econometric specification that uses expected federal government 
debt instead of the deficit, which, in contrast to using a deficit measure, is a specification 
consistent with a standard economic model of crowding-out, he estimates that a one-
percentage-point increase in the expected debt-GDP ratio increases the forward-looking 
ten-year Treasury rate by only five basis points—an estimate close to the benchmark 
calculations we presented previously.  Thus these results illustrate that whether an 
interest rate measure is regressed on the federal government deficit or on the federal 
government debt can yield markedly different implications for the magnitude of the 
associated interest rate effect.  
 Laubach suggests that the difference in these results can be reconciled by the fact 
that federal budget deficits tend to be serially correlated in historical U.S. data, and thus 
financial market participants may expect an increase in the federal government deficit to 
be persistent, and thus there is a larger increase in interest rates.
16  However, federal 
government debt is also serially correlated in U.S. data.  This is not surprising because 
federal government debt (DEBTt) at the end of time period t is the sum of the federal 
budget deficit (DEFICITt) during time period t and federal government debt at the end of 
the prior period, t-1: 
DEBTt  =  DEFICITt  + DEBTt-1. 
                                                 
16 In related research, Auerbach (2003) and Bohn (1998) note that U.S. fiscal policy appears responsive to 
fiscal conditions so that spending is reduced and/or taxes are raised when federal debt and deficits increase. 
  22If financial market participants expect an increase in federal government deficits to be 
persistent then they should also expect increases in federal government debt to be 
persistent, so it is not clear that this explanation reconciles the difference in the estimated 
interest rate effects when using federal deficits instead of federal debt.  Indeed, current 
(end-of-period) debt contains information not only about the current deficit but also 
captures all information about previous government borrowing, and thus is a better 
measure to evaluate the effect of government borrowing on the level of the interest rate, 
as suggested in our theoretical discussion above.  The change in government debt, or the 
deficit, would be expected to affect the change in the real interest rate, not necessarily the 
level of the interest rate, but that is not the econometric specification used by Laubach.  
We return to this point in our empirical work below.  
Miller and Russek (1996) show that different econometric approaches can yield 
different conclusions about the effect of federal government deficits on interest rates.  
While their conventional estimates of reduced-form specifications indicate that increases 
in the current real per capita deficit increases current nominal Treasury rates (although it 
is difficult to interpret the magnitude of this effect from their reported regression results), 
using vector autoregression (VAR) methods yields mixed results about this relationship.
17   
  Evans and Marshall (2002) use a VAR framework to investigate the 
macroeconomic determinants of the variability in the nominal Treasury yield curve.  
They find that general macroeconomic shocks account for most the variability in nominal 
                                                 
17 In related analysis, Russek and Miller (1991) find use Granger-causality tests to assess the relationship 
between federal government deficits and long-term Treasury rates.  They find bidirectional causality 
between current real per capita federal government deficits (or current real per capita federal debt) and 
long-term interest rates.  However, again it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of the effect on interest 
rates from their results. 
  23Treasury yields, with fiscal policy shocks generally having mixed effects.  Their measure 
of fiscal deficit shocks—derived from Blanchard and Perotti (2000)—does not 
significantly explain nominal Treasury yield variability.  However, they do find that the 
measure of military buildup shocks suggested by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) tends to 
increase nominal Treasury rates. 
Another approach to looking at the effects of federal government deficits on 
interest rates has been to focus on media-reported budget news.  If news concerning 
federal government deficits occasionally leads to significant movements in bond market 
prices then standard time-series techniques may have little power to identify these 
occasional, possibly nonlinear, events.  Previous economic research that has analyzed the 
effects of news announcements about federal government deficits on interest rates 
(Wachtel and Young, 1987; Thorbecke, 1993; Quigley and Porter-Hudak, 1994; Kitchen, 
1996), have generally found only small or transitory effects.  Elmendorf (1996) found 
that higher expected federal deficits and government spending tended to raise interest 
rates, but his methodology does not provide evidence of the magnitude of the effect. 
Calomiris, Engen, Hassett, and Hubbard (2003) add to this analysis of the effects 
of federal budget news on interest rates in two ways.  First, they estimated the extent to 
which monthly deviations of private-sector consensus forecasts of the federal government 
budget balance from actual monthly Treasury budget balance reports, along with 
deviations in consensus forecasts and actual reports on other macroeconomic variables, 
predict movements in interest rates.  They found that stronger than expected reports on a 
number of macroeconomic factors (such as the employment situation, industrial 
production, and retail sales, for example) tended to increase interest rates, but actual 
  24deviations from expected monthly federal government budget deficits had no statistically 
significant effect on interest rates.  Second, they collected historical data on large daily 
movements in interest rates, and catalogue the economic news that occurred on these 
days.  Typically, the days with large interest rate movements are associated with general 
economic news, rather than with federal budget news, and the movement in interest rates 
is consistent with what economic theory would suggest; that is, news that suggests more 
robust economic growth is associated with increases in interest rates.  Both of these 
approaches yielded little evidence that unexpected news about the federal budget 
situation had significant effects on interest rates.    
Evaluating effects of government debt on interest rates is difficult given the lack 
of consensus on the appropriate underlying economic model of how federal debt or 
deficits and interest rates should interact.  Moreover, variable definitions and other 
features of the data and econometric methodology vary across these studies, making it 
difficult to make comparisons.  As with most of the earlier reviews of the economic 
literature on federal debt, deficits, and interest rates, our view is that the existing evidence 
is quite mixed.  Some studies find positive effects of federal deficits on interest rates and 
others do not.  Moreover, even among the studies that do find a positive effect of deficits 
on interest rates, the magnitude of the effect on interest rates is still uncertain.  However, 
looking systematically at the influence of different econometric specifications, different 
measures of federal government debt or deficits, different measures of the interest rate, 
and different of econometric methodologies the estimated effect of federal government 
debt on interest rates hopefully will provide some insight into this issue. 
 
  25C.   Empirical Analysis of Federal Debt and Interest Rates 
We now provide some new empirical evidence on the potential effects of federal 
government debt on interest rates.  Consistent with most prior analysis, we initially 
examine this relationship by estimating a reduced-form equation: 
it = β0 + β1 dt + ГZ + εt ,  
where it is a measure of the interest rate (in time period t), dt is a measure of federal 
government debt, and Z is a vector of other relevant variables that may influence interest 
rates.  The effect of federal government debt on the interest rate is described by the 
estimate of the coefficient, β1.  
  The specification of the interest rate variable, i, and the federal government debt 
variable, d, in the reduced-form equation can take different forms.  As we noted earlier, 
the hypothesis that federal government debt might crowd out private capital formation, 
and thus raise long-term real interest rates, is typically based on a simple economic model 
as we presented above.
18  This model implies that:  
(1) the level of the real interest rate, i, is related to the level, or stock, of federal 
government debt, d, or  
(2) the change in the real interest rate, ∆i, is related to the change in federal 
government debt, ∆d, which is equal to federal government borrowing, or the deficit.   
We estimate this reduced-form equation using both of these specifications for i and d.  
Although not consistent with the specifications for i and d implied by an economic model 
                                                 
18 We focus on the effect of federal government debt on a measure of the real, long-term interest rate 
because that is the measure of the interest rate most likely to be affected by federal government debt if it is 
crowded out private capital formation.  Accordingly, we use a measure of the ten-year Treasury yield, 
adjusted for expected inflation, for our analysis. 
  26of crowding-out, we also estimate this reduced-form equation using a third specification 
in which:  
(3) the level of the real interest rate, i, is regressed on federal government borrowing 
(or the deficit), ∆d.   
A number of prior studies have used this third specification, and it is informative to 
compare the results from using this specification with those that employ the previous two 
specifications, even though it is not consistent with a simple crowding-out model.  
Economic theory suggests that it is the total stock of government debt that is the most 
relevant for explaining the level of the interest rate, not just the one-period change in 
government debt.  
Another important issue for specifying i and d is whether these are forward-
looking, or expected, measures of real interest rates and federal government debt, or 
whether they are current measures of these variables.  Previous studies have varied in 
whether forward-looking or current measures of interest rates and federal government 
debt were used in their analysis.  To compare how these different specifications for i and 
d affect estimates of the relationship between these two variables, we provide estimates 
for three different types of specifications.  In particular: 
(1) we estimate the effect of an expected, or projected, measure of federal 
government debt on a forward-looking measure of the real interest rate; 
(2) we estimate the effect of an expected, or projected, measure of federal 
government debt on a current measure of the real interest rate; and 
(3) we estimate the effect of a current measure of federal government debt on a 
current measure of the real interest rate. 
  27A number of other economic variables should be included in the vector Z, as they 
also presumably influence the determination of the real interest, i, and excluding them 
could bias the estimate of the coefficient β1.  As we noted in the earlier section discussing 
the potential theoretical effect of federal government debt on interest rates, it is important 
to account for general macroeconomic factors that can affect the performance of the 
economy.  Accordingly, in the vector Z, we include the growth rate in real GDP, which is 
a variable usually included in these types of regressions.
19  Moreover, the analysis by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Barro (1991) finds that real oil prices also are an 
important exogenous macroeconomic variable that can affect real interest rates, so we 
include a measure of real oil prices in the vector Z.
20   
Laubach (2003) observes that in a Ramsey model of economic growth, where the 
preferences of a representative household are incorporated with a production function 
similar to the one we presented in section II above, the real interest rate, r, is determined 
by: 
  r = σg + θ, 
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the representative household in the 
model, g is the growth rate of technology, and θ is the rate of time preference for the 
representative household.  He estimates that a measure of the equity premium—used as a 
proxy for risk aversion—is an important factor affecting real interest rates, so we include 
                                                 
19 Data for the growth rate of real GDP are available in the National Income and Product Accounts 
produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
20 Data for inflation-adjusted domestic crude oil prices in the United States are obtained from the 
Department of Energy.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) and Barro (1991) find that an increase in the real 
price of oil tends to increase the real interest rate, presumably because the resulting decline in investment 
demand is dominated by the fall in desired saving.   
  28it in the vector Z.
21  If relative risk aversion declines, then households may be more 
willing to purchase equities than debt instruments, thereby leading to a rise in the interest 
rate. 
  Fiscal policies other than federal government debt may also affect real interest 
rates.  Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Evans and Marshall (2002) find that exogenous 
defense spending shocks—measured by Ramey and Shapiro as a dummy variable 
denoting the time period in which a significant military buildup begins—tend to increase 
interest rates.
22  This effect is consistent with the theoretical implication of an exogenous 
increase in government consumption in a neoclassical model even if the Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis is operative.
23  Therefore we include a variable to capture 
exogenous defense spending shocks in the vector Z.
24 
While conducting monetary policy the Federal Reserve regularly purchases U.S. 
Treasury securities as the economy grows, which may reduce the impact of federal 
government debt on the real interest rate.  Thus we include a variable measuring the 
purchase of U.S. Treasury securities by the Federal Reserve, relative to GDP, in our 
specification of the regression equation.
25 
                                                 
21 As in Laubach (2003), we calculate the equity premium as dividend income from the National Income 
and Product Accounts, as a percentage of the market value of corporate equities held by households in the 
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Fund Accounts, plus the trend growth rate in real GDP, minus the real ten-year 
Treasury yield. 
22 See Cohen and Follette (2003) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) for more discussion about exogenous 
defense spending shocks. 
23 See, for example, Bernheim (1987), Barro (1989), and Seater (1993).  Baxter and King (1993) show, 
however, that in a neoclassical model that the interest rate may only increase in the short run but be 
unchanged in the long run. 
24 The time periods denoted in this dummy variable as significant military buildups includes the beginning 
of the Vietnam war buildup in 1965, the Carter-Reagan military buildup beginning in 1980, as in Ramey 
and Shapiro (1998), and also adds the beginning of the military buildup for the war in Afghanistan and Iraq 
in 2002, as in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). 
25 This variable is constructed using data on Federal Reserve purchases of U.S. Treasury securities from the 
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts expressed as a ratio to GDP from the National Income and 
Product Accounts. 
  29To summarize, in vector Z of the regression equation, we include the following 
variables: 
(1) the rate of growth in real GDP, 
(2) the real domestic crude oil price, 
(3) a measure of the equity premium (as a proxy for risk aversion), 
(4) a dummy variable for military buildups, 
(5) Federal Reserve purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. 
We now turn to our empirical results.
26 
 
C1.  Forward-looking Interest Rates and Federal Government Debt 
  The only previous study of which we are aware that analyzes the effect of 
forward-looking projections of federal government debt on a forward-looking measure of 
the real interest rate is Laubach (2003).  The purpose for using these forward-looking 
measures is to attempt to omit any effects of current economic conditions and policies 
from the empirical estimate of the effect of federal government debt on interest rates.   
Laubach constructs data from 1976 through 2003 on nominal ten-year Treasury 
rates expected to prevail five years ahead, and then subtracts a series of inflation 
expectations taken from the Federal Reserve’s econometric model of the United States.  
These data on real five-year-ahead ten-year Treasury yields are calculated to coincide 
with the CBO’s five-year-ahead projections of federal government debt and deficits, 
                                                 
26 We do not include additional variables to capture other demands on loanable funds—such as private 
sector debt—and sources of loanable funds—such as domestic and foreign saving—because of significant 
potential endogenity problems. 
  30relative to GDP, released in its annual Economic and Budget Outlook.
27  In this section, 
we use these measures of the forward-looking real interest rate and forward-looking 
federal government debt in our analysis.  We also use the CBO’s five-year ahead 
projection of real GDP growth rate.  The other variables correspond to the time period 
just preceding the release of the CBO’s annual report.   
In the first column of Table 2, we report coefficient estimates for regressions of 
the real five-year-ahead ten-year Treasury yield on the five-year projection of federal 
government debt along with the other variables.  The results imply that a one-percentage-
point (relative to GDP) increase in CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of federal 
government debt increases the real five-year-ahead ten-year Treasury yield by a little less 
than three basis points, and the estimate is statistically significantly different from zero.
28  
This estimate is also consistent with the theoretical calculations presented in Table 1.  
The estimated coefficients on all of the other variables have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant from zero, except for the insignificant coefficient estimate on the 
projected real GDP growth rate.
29 
                                                 
27 We thank Thomas Laubach for making these data on forward-looking real interest rates available to us; 
see Laubach (2003) for more details on the calculation of these data.  The data do not go back earlier than 
1976 because the CBO has been in existence only since the mid-1970s. 
28 If we estimate the more parsimonious regression specification of Laubach (2003)—which includes only 
the projected federal debt, projected real GDP growth, and the equity premium—then the results imply that 
a one-percentage-point (relative to GDP) increase in CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of federal debt 
increases the real five-year-ahead ten-year Treasury yield by a bit more than five basis points, which 
replicates his estimate.  This estimate is more than two basis points larger than when the larger set of other 
explanatory variables is used, as in the first column of Table 2, suggesting that part of Laubach’s estimated 
effect of projected debt reflected inadequate control for other current macroeconomic factors that determine 
the real interest rate.  Thus, the operating assumption that using forward-looking measures of federal 
government debt and interest rates omits any effects of current economic conditions and policies from the 
empirical estimate appears to be invalid. 
29 If the oil price, defense shock, and Federal Reserve Treasury holding variables are not included, as in 
Laubach, then the coefficient on the projected real GDP growth rate variable is estimated with the expected 
sign (positive) and is statistically significant from zero.   
  31Coefficient estimates obtained by regressing the change in the real five-year-
ahead ten-year Treasury yield on the CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of the federal 
government deficit (relative to GDP) and the other variables are reported in the second 
column of Table 2.  The results imply that a one-percentage-point (relative to GDP) 
increase in CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of the federal government deficit increases 
the change in the real five-year-ahead ten-year Treasury yield by about three basis points, 
but the estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero.   
In the third column, the regression results suggest that a one-percentage-point 
(relative to GDP) increase in CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of the federal government 
deficit increases the real five-year-ahead ten-year Treasury yield by about 18 basis points, 
and the estimate is statistically significantly different from zero.
30  As we noted earlier, 
however, this specification is not consistent with one implied by an economic model of 
crowding out, so interpreting this result is difficult.  The stock of federal debt is most 
relevant for determining the level of the interest rate, and the deficit, which represents 
only the most recent period’s change in the debt, does not contain all relevant 
information—specifically, prior accumulated federal debt—contained in the measure of 
total federal debt.  However, because CBO’s projections of federal deficits (as a 
percentage of GDP) are closely correlated with their projections of federal debt (as a 
percentage of GDP)—the correlation coefficient between these two series is 0.89 over the 
sample period—then the coefficient estimate on the smaller deficit component also picks 
                                                 
30 If the set of independent variables includes only the projected federal deficit, projected real GDP growth, 
and the equity premium, as in Laubach (2003), then the regression results imply that a one-percentage-point 
(relative to GDP) increase in CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of federal deficit increases the real five-
year-ahead ten-year Treasury yield by 28 basis points, which replicates his estimate.  This estimate is 
almost ten basis points larger than when the larger set of other explanatory variables is used in the third 
column of Table 2. 
 
  32up the effect of prior accumulated government debt, and the coefficient estimate is larger 
than when total government debt is used. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that the estimated effect of projected federal 
government debt or deficits on a forward-looking measure of the real interest rate 
depends importantly on the specification.  The estimates for the two specifications 
consistent with the analytical model of crowding out presented earlier imply that an 
increase in federal government debt of one percent of GDP raises the real interest rate by, 
at most, about three basis points. 
 
C2. Current Interest Rates and Expected Federal Government Debt 
In this section we employ a measure of the current real ten-year Treasury yield in 
our analysis while all of the other variables remain the same as in the previous section.  
The nominal ten-year Treasury yields over the months that the CBO projections were 
released were then adjusted for expected inflation to construct the current real interest 
rates used in this section of our analysis.
31   
The first column of Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates when regressing the 
level of the real ten-year Treasury yield on the five-year-ahead projection of federal 
government debt (relative to GDP) made by the CBO, along with the other explanatory 
variables.  The estimates imply that a one-percentage-point increase in the expected 
federal government debt-to-GDP ratio increases the current real ten-year Treasury yield 
by a little more than three basis points, and is statistically significantly different from 
zero.  This estimate is about one-half of one basis point larger than when the forward-
                                                 
31 We obtained data for the nominal ten-year Treasury from the Federal Reserve Board, and the data for 
average inflation expectations from the Livingston Survey maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. 
  33looking real ten-year Treasury yield was used in the specification reported in the first 
column of Table 2. 
The coefficient estimates for the specification regressing the change in the current 
real ten-year Treasury yield on CBO’s five-year-ahead projection of the federal 
government deficit (relative to GDP), along with the other variables, are reported in the 
second column of Table 3.  Similar to the estimate in the first column, the estimated 
coefficient on the projected deficit variable implies that a one-percentage-point increase 
in CBO’s projection of the federal government deficit (relative to GDP) increases the 
current real ten-year Treasury yield by about three basis points, but here this estimate is 
not statistically significantly different from zero.  In contrast, when instead the level of 
the current real ten-year Treasury yield is regressed on CBO’s projection of the federal 
government deficit, the estimated relationship suggests that increasing the expected 
federal deficit-to-GDP ratio by one by one percentage point causes the current real ten-
year Treasury yield to increase by almost 24 basis points.  While this estimate is 
statistically significant from zero, it is far larger than the benchmark calculations 
presented in Table 1, and it is also about five basis points larger than the corresponding 
estimate in Table 2 in which the forward-looking measure of the real ten-year was used.  
However, as discussed previously, this specification is not consistent with an economic 
model of crowding out.  The coefficient estimate on the deficit is larger because it also 
incorporates the effect of prior accumulated federal government debt that is included in 
the total federal debt variable in the first column but is not included when just using the 
deficit measure in the third column. 
  34The results in Table 3 indicate that the estimated effect of projected federal 
government debt or deficits on a current measure of the real interest rate are only a bit 
larger than those in which the forward-looking measure of the real interest rate was 
employed in estimating the results in Table 2.  However, the forward-looking measure of 
the real interest rate may be a better measure for trying to separate the effect of current 
economic conditions on the interest rate and isolate the effect of expected federal 
government debt on real interest rates. 
As before, the estimated results also depend importantly on the specification of 
the regression equation.  The coefficient estimates derived using the two specifications of 
real interest rates consistent with a an economic model of crowding out—the first two 
columns—imply that federal government debt may have a statistically significant effect 
on the level of real interest rates (or not, as shown in second column), but, if so, the 
effect—about 3 basis points for an increase in the debt of one percent of GDP—is 
consistent with benchmark calculations presented earlier. 
 
C3. Current Interest Rates and Current Federal Government Debt 
While using expected measures of interest rates and federal debt is a much more 
theoretically appealing approach to estimating the relationship between these variables, 
many previous studies have used only current measures federal debt and interest rates.  
Thus it is informative to estimate the effects of current federal debt on current real ten-
year Treasury yields in order to compare the results to those of the prior sections. 
  35To do so, we replace the data for CBO’s annual projections of federal government 
debt and deficits with data on current federal government debt and borrowing.
32  We also 
replace CBO’s projections for the rate of growth in real GDP with current real GDP 
growth rates. The current real ten-year Treasury yield measure reflects the prevailing rate 
at the end of each year and is constructed the same as in the prior section.
33  All of the 
other variables are the same as in the previous analysis. 
As we show in the first column of Table 4, when using current federal 
government debt (relative to GDP) and a measure of the current real ten-year Treasury 
yield, the regression results imply that a one-percentage-point increase in the federal 
debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to increase the real ten-year Treasury rate by a little less 
than five basis points, but the coefficient estimate is not statistically significantly 
different from zero.
34  The second column reports estimates for the regression equation 
where the change in the real ten-year Treasury yield is regressed on federal borrowing.  
The results imply that a one-percentage-point increase in federal government borrowing 
(relative to GDP) increases real ten-year Treasury rates by seven basis points, but again 
this estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero.   
Alternatively, if the level of the real ten-year Treasury yield is regressed on this 
measure of federal government borrowing, the coefficient estimates shown in the third 
column imply that a one-percentage-point increase in the federal government borrowing-
to-GDP ratio increases the real ten-year Treasury rate by about nine basis points, 
                                                 
32 These data are from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts.  Because the time period of 
the data is not limited by the availability of CBO projections, we extend the data back to 1953.  
33 The timing is adjusted slightly so that it reflects the prevailing interest rate at the end of the year 
(December) rather than the month when the CBO projections are released (which is typically in the 
following month of January). 
34 Preliminary estimates of this equation revealed the presence of serially correlated errors so the regression 
results reported here are for estimates with an AR(1) corrected specification of the residuals. 
  36although this effect is not statistically significantly different from zero as in the first two 
specifications.  This estimate of the empirical relationship between federal government 
borrowing and the level of the real ten-year Treasury yield in Table 4 is markedly smaller 
than the corresponding estimates in Tables 2 and 3, which used forward-looking 
measures of federal government borrowing and the real interest rate.  Unlike the strong 
positive correlation between CBO’s projected measures of federal debt and the deficit, 
there is not a positive correlation between actual federal debt and borrowing (both 
measured as a percent of GDP); the correlation coefficient is –0.13 for these two series. 
 
C4.  Vector Autoregressions 
An alternative approach to the reduced-form equation estimation used in our 
analysis above is to estimate the relationship between federal government debt, or federal 
government borrowing, and the level of the real ten-year Treasury rate in a VAR 
framework.  This methodology has been used in a number of empirical studies of the 
relationship between federal government debt and borrowing.   
In estimating the VARs, we use the same data as those in the first and third 
columns of Tables 2 through 4; thus we analyze the effect of a measure of the federal 
debt on the level of the interest rate and the effect of a measure of the federal deficit on 
the level of the interest rate.  A useful way to analyze the results of the VAR estimates is 
to look at the impulse responses generated from these estimates.  The corresponding 
impulse responses stemming from VAR estimates using projected federal government 
debt and the five-year ahead measure of the ten-year real Treasury rate are shown in 
Figure 15, and Figure 16 shows the impulse responses when the projected federal 
  37government deficits (instead of debt) is used in the VAR.  The ordering of the variables 
that is used to generate these impulse responses is the same as the order of the charts in 
each figure: real oil prices, military buildup shocks, Treasury security holdings (or 
purchases) by the Federal Reserve, projected federal government debt (or deficits), the 
equity premium, and the projected real GDP growth rate.  The charts of the impulse 
responses also include the plus or minus two-standard-error bands, using Monte Carlo 
standard errors.   
In Figure 15, the second chart from the top on the right side shows the response of 
the five-year-ahead real ten-year Treasury rate from a one-standard deviation shock to 
projected federal government debt. The response of the forward-looking measure of the 
real interest rate to an increase in projected federal debt (relative to GDP) is positive and 
statistically significant in the first period.  A one-standard deviation shock in the 
projected federal debt-to-GDP ratio, which is equal to 16.3 percent, is estimated to 
increase the forward-looking real interest rate by 26.6 basis points.  Thus, this estimate 
implies that an increase in federal debt equal to one percent of GDP causes the real 
interest rate to increase by about 1½ basis point, which is somewhat smaller than the 
corresponding estimate from the reduced form regression results in Table 2 but is still 
consistent with the theoretical calculations presented in Table 1.  As shown in the 
corresponding variance decomposition presented in Table 5, only 10 percent of the 
variation in the forward-looking measure of the real interest rate is due to the innovation 
in projected federal debt.  
Figure 16 shows the impulse responses from the VAR estimates when the 
projected federal government deficit (relative to GDP) is used instead of federal 
  38government debt.  An increase in the projected federal government deficit is estimated 
here to have a positive effect on the five-year-ahead measure of the real ten-year Treasury 
yield and is statistically significantly different from zero in the first period.  A one-
standard deviation shock in the projected federal deficit-to-GDP ratio, which is equal to 3 
percent, is estimated to increase the forward-looking real interest rate by 36.6 basis 
points.  Thus, this estimate implies that an increase in the federal deficit equal to one 
percent of GDP causes the real interest rate to increase by about 12 basis points, which is 
somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimate from the reduced form regression 
results in Table 2.
35  However, this specification is not consistent with our analytical 
model of crowding out, and the estimated effect is much larger than the benchmark 
calculations presented in Table 1.  The estimated effect of the projected deficit also is 
larger than the effect of the projected federal debt, as in the reduced-form regression 
estimates in Table 2, but, as explained above, this is because the projected deficit variable 
is strongly correlated with the projected debt variable and the deficit variable does not 
include the relevant information on prior accumulated federal debt. 
Figures 17 and 18 show the impulse responses of the current real ten-year 
Treasury rate to innovations in the projected measures of federal debt and deficits along 
with our other explanatory variables.  The second chart from the top on the right side of 
Figure 17 shows the impulse response of the current real ten-year Treasury rate from a 
one-standard deviation shock to projected federal government debt.  The projected 
federal debt is estimated to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
current real interest rate. A one-standard deviation shock in the projected federal debt-to-
                                                 
35 As shown in the corresponding variance decomposition presented in Table 6, about 28 percent of the 
variation in the forward-looking measure of the real interest rate is due to the innovation in projected 
federal deficit.   
  39GDP ratio (equal to 16.3 percent) is estimated to increase the current real interest rate by 
40 basis points.  Thus, this estimate implies that an increase in federal debt equal to one 
percent of GDP causes the current real interest rate to increase by about 2½ basis points.  
This estimate is somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimate from the reduced 
form regression results in Table 3 but is still consistent with the theoretical calculations 
presented in Table 1.  As shown in the corresponding variance decomposition presented 
in Table 7, about 37 percent of the variation in the current real interest rate is due to the 
innovation in projected federal debt.  
As shown in Figure 18, the effect of the projected federal deficit on the current 
real interest rate is positive but not statistically significantly different from zero, in 
contrast to both the results in Figure 16 when the forward-looking measure of the real 
interest rate was used and the corresponding estimate from the reduced form regression 
results in Table 3.  Figures 19 and 20 also show that innovations in the current federal 
debt, or current federal borrowing, have effects on the current real interest rate that are 
not statistically significantly different from zero.  These results are similar to the 
corresponding estimates shown in Table 4 for our reduced-form regression analysis. 
  In general, our analysis of the effect of federal government debt on the real 
interest rate using VAR analysis are fairly similar to the results we find from our 
reduced-form regression estimates.  Projected measures of the federal debt tend to have a 
statistically significant, positive effect on forward-looking or current real interest rates; an 
increase in the projected federal debt equal to one percent of GDP is estimated to increase 
the real interest rate by about two to three basis points.  However, current measures of the 
federal debt do not have a statistically significant effect on current real interest rates. 
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IV. Conclusions 
As we noted at the outset, the recent reemergence of U.S. federal government 
budget deficits has focused attention on an old question:  Does government debt affect 
interest rates?  Despite a substantial body of empirical analysis, the answer based on the 
past two decades of research is mixed.  While some studies suggest a small increase of in 
the real interest rate when federal debt increases, others estimate large effects, and some 
studies find no statistically significant interest rate effect.  Comparing results across 
studies is complicated by differences in economic models, definitions of “government 
debt” and “interest rates,” econometric approaches, sources of data, and rhetoric. 
Using a standard set of data and a simple economic framework, we reconsider and 
add to empirical evidence on the effect of federal government debt and interest rates.  We 
begin by deriving analytically the effect of government debt on the real interest rate and 
conclude that an increase in government debt equivalent to one percent of GDP would be 
predicted to increase the real interest rate by about two to three basis points.  While some 
existing studies estimate effects in this range, others find larger effects.  In virtually all 
cases, larger estimates come from specifications relating federal deficits (as opposed to 
debt) and the level interest rates (as opposed to changes in interest rates). 
We present our own empirical analysis in two parts.  First, we examine a variety 
of conventional reduced-form specifications linking interest rates and government debt 
and other variables.  In particular, we provide estimates for three types of specifications 
to permit comparisons among different approaches taken in previous research; we 
estimate the effect of:  (1) an expected, or projected, measure of federal government debt 
  41on a forward-looking measure of the real interest rate; (2) an expected, or projected, 
measure of federal government debt on a current measure of the real interest rate; and (3) 
a current measure of federal government debt on a current measure of the real interest 
rate.  Most of the statistically significant estimated effects are consistent with the 
prediction of our economic model calculations.  Second, we provide evidence using 
vector autoregression analysis.  In general, these results are similar to those found in our 
reduced-form econometric analysis and consistent with the analytical calculations. 
Taken together, the bulk of our empirical results suggest that an increase in 
federal government debt equivalent to one percent of GDP, all else equal, would be 
expected to increase the long-term real rate of interest by about three basis points, while 
some estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero.  By presenting a 
range of results with the same data, we illustrate the dependence of estimation on 
specification and definition differences.   
This paper is deliberately narrow in its scope; our focus, as the paper’s title 
suggests, is only on the interest rate effects of government debt.  The effect of debt and 
deficits on interest rates has been the focus of much of the recent and previous policy 
discussions concerning the effects of government borrowing on investment and economic 
activity.  However, we do believe that other effects of federal debt and deficits on 
economic factors other than interest rates are important topics for analysis.  We have not 
investigated the degree to which federal borrowing might be offset by private domestic 
saving or inflows of foreign saving or both.  These factors interact with federal borrowing 
  42in ways that may have similar effects on interest rates but different effects on the overall 
economy.
36   
Our findings should not be construed as implying that “deficits don’t matter.”  
Substantially larger, persistent, and unsustainable levels of government debt can 
eventually put increasing strains on the available domestic and foreign sources of 
loanable funds, and can represent a large transfer of wealth to finance current 
generations’ consumption from future generations which much eventually pay down 
federal debt to a sustainable level.  Holding the path of non-interest government outlays 
constant, deficits represent higher future tax burdens to cover both these outlays plus 
interest expenses associated with the debt, which have adverse consequences for 
economic growth.  In the United States at the present time, unfunded implicit obligations 
associated with the Social Security and Medicare programs are particularly of concern.
37
                                                 
36 Recent federal income tax reductions have also rekindled interest in the impact of deficits on 
consumption.   Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2004) investigate the 
impact of deficit-increasing tax reductions on household consumption. 
37 See Congressional Budget Office (2003) and Gokhale and Smetters (2003), for example, for recent 
discussions of the potentially large unfunded obligations associated with these entitlement programs. 
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Effects of Macroeconomic and Projected Debt Variables
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Effects of Macroeconomic and Projected Deficit Variables
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Effects of Macroeconomic and Projected Debt Variables
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Effects of Macroeconomic and Projected Deficit Variables
on Current Real Treasury Rate,
VAR Analysis
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  60Table 1 
Changes in Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates: 
Calculations from an Economic Model of Crowding Out 
 
Change in interest rates (basis points) 
Increase in 
Federal debt 
(% of GDP) 
No offset 
∂K/∂D = -1 
(1) 
20% offset 
∂K/∂D = -0.8 
(2) 
40% offset 
∂K/∂D = -0.6 
(3) 
1)   1 percent  2.4  1.9  1.4 
2)   5 percent  11.8  9.5  7.1 
3)  10 percent  23.7  18.9  14.2 
Eliminate  
Federal Debt 
   
4)  $4 trillion  -86  -69  -52 
 
  61Table 2 
 
Regression Results for Real Five-Year-Ahead Ten-Year Treasury Rate and 
CBO Five-Year-Ahead Federal Debt or Deficit Projections 
(1976-2003) 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
 
(1) 






Level of  
Treasury rate 
Federal Debt/GDP  0.028 
(0.011)
*  ---- ---- 





Real GDP growth rate  -0.014 
(0.284)
  ----  0.029 
(0.279) 
Change in 
Real GDP growth rate  ----  -0.851 
(0.246)  ---- 








Real Oil price  ----
  0.028 
(0.018)
  ---- 
Equity premium  -0.269 
(0.134)




Equity premium  ----
  -0.332 
 (0.164)
















*    
Federal Reserve 
Treasury purchases  ----













Adjusted R-squared  0.69  0.32  0.69 
DW statistic  2.52  2.90  2.39 
N 28  28  28 
Note:   Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.   
*   = coefficient estimate significant at 10% level. 
 
 
  62Table 3 
 
Regression Results for Current Real Ten-Year Treasury Rate and 
CBO Five-Year-Ahead Federal Debt or Deficit Projections 
(1976-2003) 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
 
(1) 






Level of  
Treasury rate 
Federal Debt/GDP  0.033 
(0.013)
*  ---- ---- 





Real GDP growth rate  -0.373 
(0.291)
  ----  -0.266 
(0.347) 
Change in 
Real GDP growth rate  ----  -0.607 
(0.417)  ---- 








Real Oil price  ----
  0.064 
(0.051)
  ---- 
Equity premium  -0.376 
(0.134)




Equity premium  ----
  -0.472 
 (0.189)














*    
Federal Reserve 
Treasury purchases  ----













Adjusted R-squared  0.86  0.42  0.86 
DW statistic  1.68  2.90  1.68 
N 28  28  28 
Note:   Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.   
*   = coefficient estimate significant at 10% level. 
 
 
  63Table 4 
 
Regression Results for Current Real Ten-Year Treasury Rate and 
Current Federal Debt or Borrowing 
(1953-2003) 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
 
(1) 






Level of  
Treasury rate 
Federal Debt/GDP  0.047 
(0.036)
  ---- ---- 




Real GDP growth rate  0.102 
 (0.049)




Real GDP growth rate  ----  0.100 
 (0.035)
*  ---- 








Real Oil price  ----
  0.115 
 (0.042)
*  ---- 
Equity premium  -0.224 
  (0.297)




Equity premium  ----
  -0.091 
 (0.302)













 (0.525)    
Federal Reserve 
Treasury purchases  ----





Constant  1.976 
(4.407) 




AR(1)  0.521 
(0.128)
*    
Adjusted R-squared  0.60  0.21  0.59 
DW statistic  2.02  2.56  2.13 
N 50  50  50 
Note:   Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.   
*   = coefficient estimate significant at 10% level. 
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 Period S.E. Oil Defense Treasury Projected Equity Real GDP Real Treasury
Price Shock Holdings Federal Debt Premium Growth Yield
1 4.50 30.26 8.27 36.82 10.05 1.39 9.65 3.56
(16.28) (10.13) (12.60) (6.09) (1.67) (4.16) (1.24)
2 6.29 33.78 6.62 35.73 8.23 2.32 10.29 3.02
(16.22) (9.52) (12.95) (5.70) (5.20) (5.25) (1.41)
3 6.88 27.45 14.04 30.73 10.81 5.12 8.99 2.87
(14.29) (17.39) (12.22) (6.91) (5.15) (4.53) (2.06)
4 7.60 23.22 32.01 20.53 11.14 4.91 5.97 2.21
(15.33) (16.17) (12.13) (5.91) (4.48) (4.29) (1.71)
5 8.41 21.58 40.13 15.83 9.86 6.12 4.80 1.68
(13.77) (17.43) (12.84) (6.40) (4.61) (4.42) (1.47)
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Cholesky Ordering: Oil Price, Defense Shock, Federal Reserve Treasury Holdings, Projected Federal Debt, Equity Premium, Projected Real GDP Growth, 
Forward-Looking Real Treasury Yield
Variance Decomposition of Five-Year-Ahead Ten-Year Treasury Rate




  65Federal Reserve  Projected Forward-Looking
Oil Defense Treasury Projected Equity Real GDP Real Treasury
 Period S.E. Price Shock Purchases Federal Deficit Premium Growth Yield
1 3.88 4.79 6.11 45.68 28.35 1.92 1.04 12.10
(8.77) (8.29) (14.05) (10.09) (2.20) (1.85) (4.74)
2 7.04 21.32 3.92 39.76 16.01 10.98 1.18 6.82
(13.70) (8.13) (10.23) (6.91) (9.70) (3.24) (3.12)
3 7.77 17.95 13.98 29.91 14.71 14.67 3.63 5.14
(12.79) (14.57) (9.84) (7.73) (8.30) (3.56) (3.15)
4 8.27 16.22 29.02 21.39 10.77 15.30 3.67 3.63
(12.30) (17.78) (9.35) (6.76) (8.53) (2.79) (2.70)
5 8.91 14.51 35.21 19.29 9.07 14.21 4.51 3.20
(12.40) (17.08) (8.11) (8.79) (7.94) (3.86) (2.83)
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Table 6
Variance Decomposition of Five-Year-Ahead Ten-Year Treasury Rate
(corresponds to impulse responses in Figure 16)
Cholesky Ordering: Oil Price, Defense Shock, Federal Reserve Treasury Purchases, Projected Federal Deficit, Equity Premium, Projected Real GDP Growth, 




  66Federal Reserve  Projected Current
 Period S.E. Oil Defense Treasury Projected Equity Real GDP Real Treasury
Price Shock Holdings Federal Debt Premium Growth Yield
1 5.12 16.84 5.67 0.65 37.42 7.09 1.91 30.41
(13.88) (7.98) (5.39) (13.96) (7.63) (3.29) (10.28)
2 6.44 21.01 7.02 4.91 24.25 17.08 2.93 22.78
(15.97) (9.09) (8.29) (9.60) (9.87) (3.81) (7.90)
3 6.94 9.10 52.38 1.81 16.84 9.07 1.78 9.02
(16.54) (19.78) (6.64) (8.12) (5.77) (3.55) (4.74)
4 8.22 12.44 51.65 2.73 11.20 14.34 1.15 6.50
(15.49) (17.04) (6.06) (7.59) (8.71) (3.61) (3.77)
5 9.48 7.54 64.47 3.40 6.80 10.53 0.92 6.34
(13.49) (16.53) (5.53) (6.74) (7.03) (3.86) (4.78)
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Table 7
Variance Decomposition of Current Ten-Year Treasury Rate
(corresponds to impulse responses in Figure 17)
Cholesky Ordering: Oil Price, Defense Shock, Federal Reserve Treasury Holdings, Projected Federal Debt, Equity Premium, Projected Real GDP Growth, 
Current Real Treasury Yield
 
 
  67Federal Reserve  Projected Current
 Period S.E. Oil Defense Treasury Projected Equity Real GDP Real Treasury
Price Shock Purchases Federal Deficit Premium Growth Yield
1 4.30 5.80 7.29 0.34 10.26 24.80 5.29 46.21
(10.18) (8.22) (4.69) (8.45) (11.53) (5.69) (10.96)
2 7.11 20.56 6.40 20.19 4.31 24.55 2.54 21.45
(17.06) (7.52) (12.98) (6.25) (10.04) (3.40) (6.19)
3 8.00 9.35 49.35 9.98 4.51 15.37 1.34 10.10
(14.16) (19.53) (9.32) (5.68) (7.67) (3.24) (3.87)
4 8.33 7.27 50.87 6.90 3.26 22.84 2.03 6.83
(11.94) (17.68) (10.14) (5.51) (9.76) (3.57) (3.77)
5 8.92 5.99 59.25 6.19 3.26 16.84 1.68 6.79
(12.05) (15.99) (9.99) (7.92) (7.07) (3.02) (3.39)
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Table 8
Variance Decomposition of Current Ten-Year Treasury Rate
(corresponds to impulse responses in Figure 18)
Cholesky Ordering: Oil Price, Defense Shock, Federal Reserve Treasury Purchases, Projected Federal Deficit, Equity Premium, Projected Real GDP Growth, 




  68Federal Reserve  Current
 Period S.E. Oil Defense Treasury Federal Equity Real GDP Real Treasury
Price Shock Holdings Debt Premium Growth Yield
1 4.23 7.15 2.41 0.25 6.86 1.78 22.09 59.46
(6.31) (5.06) (2.86) (6.77) (3.38) (8.97) (11.45)
2 5.42 15.57 3.65 0.22 5.45 6.49 22.48 46.14
(9.37) (6.83) (5.41) (5.97) (7.38) (9.03) (10.54)
3 6.54 15.25 3.44 6.12 7.39 9.71 20.44 37.66
(10.19) (5.76) (8.93) (6.68) (8.27) (7.87) (9.73)
4 7.39 13.10 3.33 6.42 13.60 8.53 20.14 34.87
(10.33) (6.76) (8.63) (8.01) (8.11) (7.14) (7.93)
5 8.10 15.49 6.91 6.18 19.09 6.78 17.23 28.33
(9.79) (8.92) (7.84) (8.46) (8.13) (7.00) (6.50)
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Table 9
Variance Decomposition of Current Ten-Year Treasury Rate
(corresponds to impulse responses in Figure 19)
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 Period S.E. Oil Defense Treasury  Federal Equity Real GDP Real Treasury
Price Shock Purchases Borrowing Premium Growth Yield
1 4.72 7.17 0.25 0.12 2.07 6.70 22.07 61.62
(7.85) (3.39) (3.71) (3.68) (7.05) (8.69) (9.88)
2 6.19 12.99 6.32 2.60 3.63 13.04 18.56 42.86
(11.01) (7.94) (6.52) (6.43) (9.31) (6.87) (9.35)
3 6.99 18.71 6.27 10.46 3.43 11.25 15.69 34.20
(12.79) (9.39) (8.00) (6.46) (7.06) (6.07) (7.79)
4 7.47 16.51 5.22 9.41 7.17 10.73 18.05 32.91
(11.29) (8.63) (9.13) (7.70) (6.40) (6.16) (7.16)
5 7.82 18.65 9.94 8.52 8.52 8.91 17.70 27.76
(11.13) (11.15) (8.25) (7.50) (6.39) (6.91) (6.37)
 Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Table 10
Variance Decomposition of Current Ten-Year Treasury Rate
(corresponds to impulse responses in Figure 20)
 Cholesky Ordering: Oil Price, Defense Shock, Fedeal Reserve Treasury Purchases, Federal Borrowing, Equity Premium, Real GDP Growth, Current Real 
Treasury Yield
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